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INTRODUCTION

Public and private organizations and associations that collectively administer
copyright and neighbouring rights on behalf of creators and rights owners operate
under a diverse array of contracts, laws and regulations. At the centre of this
regulatory matrix are agreements that define the organizations’ relationship with
the individuals and corporations that are its members. These agreements address
issues such as the criteria for membership and affiliation, the licensing, monitoring
and enforcement authority that the organization possess, and the rules for allocating and distributing royalties. Moving outward from this contractual core are
specialized laws that recognize collective management organizations (CMOs)
and regulate their activities. Laws of general applicability form the outermost
layer of regulation. These laws include copyright statutes, legislation regulating
corporations and business associations and, most famously, competition laws that
prevent abuses of the dominant market positions that often follow from the
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concentration of licensing authority within a single entity or a very small number
of entities.1
Given this complex regulatory environment, it may be surprising and perhaps
unwelcome news to CMOs and their members that another body of law is relevant
to the collective administration of copyright. Yet for more than fifty years, treaties
and customary international law have recognized certain moral and material interests of creators of intellectual property as human rights. Until recently, the conceptualization of these interests as internationally protected human rights was all
but unexplored. Although both the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR or ‘the Covenant’) protect the moral and material interests of
authors and inventors,2 as well as the public’s right ‘to enjoy the arts and to share in
scientific advancement and its benefits’,3 these provisions provide only a skeletal
outline of how to develop human rights-compliant rules and policies for governments to promote creativity and innovation. They also leave unanswered the critical question of how those rules and policies interface with existing intellectual
property protection systems.
Recent events have highlighted the need to address these issues and to develop
a distinctive ‘human rights framework’ for intellectual property.4 Over the last
decade, intellectual property protection standards have expanded dramatically,
both in their subject matter and in the scope of the economic interests they protect.
Nation states have also linked these rights to the world trading system, creating
new opportunities for enforcement at the international and national levels. These
twin developments have made intellectual property protection rules relevant to an
expanding array of value-laden economic, social and political issues, including
public health, education, agriculture, privacy and free expression.5
This chapter considers in depth one aspect of this emerging human rights
framework – the relevance of the ‘creators’ rights’6 provisions of the ICESCR
1. For a comprehensive discussion of these laws, regulations, and contacts, see D. Sinacore-Guinn,
Collective Administration of Copyrights and Neighboring Rights: International Practices, Procedures, and Organizations (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1993), 866 at 519–620.
2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 27(2); International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Art. 15(1)(c) & 15(1)(b).
3. UDHR, ibid., Art. 27(1).
4. L. Helfer, ‘Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property’, U.C. Davis Law
Review 40 (2007): 971. For a more detailed analysis, see L. Helfer & G. Austin, Human Rights
and Intellectual Property: Mapping the Global Interface (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2011) (forthcoming).
5. For further discussion of these trends, see L. Helfer, ‘Human Rights and Intellectual Property:
Conflict or Coexistence?’ Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 22 (2004): 167, at 171–175;
L. Helfer, ‘Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking’, Yale International Law Journal 29 (2004): 1, at 26–45.
6. To avoid confusion with terms such as droit d’auteur, this chapter uses the phrase ‘creators’
rights’ to describe the legal entitlements for authors and inventors recognized in international
human rights law. As explained in greater detail below, these legal protections are not coterminous with those of copyright or droit d’auteur. For a general discussion of the distinctions
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to the collective administration of copyright in general and to the policies
and practices of CMOs in particular. It also addresses other human rights treaty
provisions and international court rulings that are relevant to collective rights
management.
The chapter focuses primarily on two documents issued by the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘the ICESCR Committee’ or ‘the Committee’). The Committee is a supervisory body of eighteen human rights experts who
monitor the implementation of the Covenant – a treaty that imposes legally binding
obligations upon 156 member nations.7 Because many of the Covenant’s provisions are ambiguously worded, one of the Committee’s principal functions is to
provide guidance to member nations as to the treaty’s meaning. This guidance
takes the form of nonbinding but persuasive recommendations that can serve as
focal points for legal change at the national level. Formally, these recommendations are directed to governments and other state actors. But their scope – like that
of the ICESCR itself – is not limited to public laws or regulations. They extend as
well to individuals, groups and business associations – including CMOs – whose
actions implicate social, economic and cultural rights. Although these non-state
actors have no direct human rights responsibilities under the Covenant, governments are required to regulate their activities to satisfy their own treaty
obligations.8
The ICESCR Committee’s initial foray into the intellectual property arena
began in 2001, when it published an official Statement on Human Rights and
Intellectual Property9 that contained a preliminary analysis of creators’ rights and
their relationship to other economic and social rights. The Statement contemplated
that the Committee would eventually publish more extensive ‘general comments’
on Article 15, the provision of the Covenant most relevant to intellectual property
issues.10 The first of these general comments, an exegesis on Article 15(1)(c) – ‘the

7.
8.
9.

10.

between the latter two concepts, see A. Strowel, Droit D’auteur et Copyright: Divergences et
Convergences (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1993) (comprehensively
comparing droit d’auteur and copyright).
United Nations Treaty Collection, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Signatories and States Parties, online: <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?
src¼TREATY&mtdsg_no¼IV-3&chapter¼4&lang¼en> (last visited: 9 Sep. 2009.
For a thoughtful and influential analysis of these issues, see A. Clapham, Human Rights in the
Private Sphere (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 422.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Follow-up to
the day of general discussion on Article 15.1(c), Monday, 26 November 2001’ (14 Dec. 2001),
E/C.12/2001/15, [Statement on Human Rights and Intellectual Property], online:
<www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/1e1f4514f8512432c1256ba6003b2cc6/$FILE/G0146641.pdf>
(last visited: 9 Sep. 2009).
Ibid., at para. 2. In addition to reviewing periodic reports by States on the measures they have
taken to comply with the Covenant, the ICESCR Committee periodically issues ‘general comments’ that infuse the treaty with greater clarity and meaning. Although these interpretative
statements do not bind states parties, they create widely shared expectations as to the meaning of
the treaty’s text. See M. Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: A Perspective on Its Development (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). General comments
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right of everyone to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the
author’ – was published by the Committee in 2005.11
These two documents provide a partial outline of a human rights framework
for intellectual property, one aspect of which I analyse in the remainder of this
chapter. Most importantly, the documents demonstrate that such a framework is
not restricted to protecting creators and innovators and the fruits of their intellectual endeavours. Rather, it gives equal importance to protecting the rights of the
public to benefit from the scientific and cultural progress that intellectual property
products can engender. However, one of the most challenging tasks for the
ICESCR Committee is how to strike an appropriate balance between these two
sets of rights – a balance that promotes compliance with treaty obligations and their
underlying human rights values, and that provides a coherent interface with
national and international intellectual property laws.
A few caveats are in order before turning to an analysis of how these issues play
out in the specific context of CMOs. This chapter assumes that readers have at least a
rudimentary understanding of copyright and neighbouring rights laws and how creative works protected by such laws are collectively administered,12 but it does
not presume familiarity with international human rights law or its recent application
to intellectual property issues. In addition, the chapter does not provide an exhaustive treatment of the many intersections between human rights and copyright,13

specify States’ commitments in far greater detail than the treaty itself, for example, by identifying certain core obligations for states to provide ‘at the very least, minimum essential levels
of each of the rights’ in the treaty. See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
‘General Comment No. 3, The nature of States parties obligations (Art. 2, para. 1 of the
Covenant)’ (1990), E/1991/23 at para. 10 [General Comment No. 3], online: <www.unhchr.
ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/94bdbaf59b43a424c12563ed0052b664?Opendocument> (last visited:
9 Sep. 2009) (in which core obligations are distinguishable from ‘obligations of result’, which
States may achieve by a variety of means over time).
11. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘The right of everyone to benefit from the
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic
production of which he is the author (Art. 15(1)(c) of the Covenant)’, General Comment
No. 17 (21 Nov. 2005) [hereinafter General Comment], online: <www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/
(Symbol)/E.C.12.GC.17.En?OpenDocument> (last visited: 9 Sep. 2009). In December 2009,
the Committee issued General Comment No. 21 ‘Right of everyone to take part in cultural life
(art. 15, para. 1 (a), of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)’,
online: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/comments.htm> (last visited: 4 May
2010).
12. For a ‘basic definition’ of the functions that collective management organizations perform, see
M. Ficsor, Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights (Geneva: World Intellectual Property Organization, 2002), 165 at 17 (stating that the ‘owners of rights authorize
collective management organizations to monitor the use of their works, negotiate with prospective users, give them licenses against appropriate remuneration on the basis of a tariff system
and . . . collect remuneration, and distribute it among the owners of rights’).
13. Readers seeking additional analysis of these issues may wish to consult the following
sources: P. Torremans (ed.), Intellectual Property and Human Rights (The Hague: Kluwer
Law International, 2008); P. Torremans (ed.), Copyright and Human Rights: Freedom of
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but instead analyses a selection of salient legal and policy issues relating to
collective.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an
overview of the ICESCR Committee’s statement on human rights and intellectual
property and of its General Comment. It highlights basic distinctions between the
Committee’s approach to protecting creators and the approach adopted in intellectual property treaties and national intellectual property laws, with the goal of
making the Committee’s analysis more accessible to intellectual property lawyers
and legal scholars. Section 3 provides an overview of the key concepts in the
Committee’s analysis relevant to the collective administration of copyright and
neighbouring rights. It argues that a human rights framework for intellectual property supports many of the functions that CMOs already perform. Part 3 notes,
however, that certain practices and policies of CMOs may be in conflict with
the analysis of the Covenant enunciated by the ICESCR Committee. Section 4 considers in greater depth two legal and policy issues with important human rights
implications: whether membership in CMOs should be mandatory or voluntary and
whether CMOs should promote national culture. Section 5 concludes with an
analysis of the practical implications of adopting a human rights framework for
analysing the collective administration of copyright and for the international
intellectual property system more generally.
2

INTRODUCING A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

If intellectual property lawyers were asked to list the freedoms and liberties that
international human rights law protects, they would likely name widely recognized
civil and political rights, such as the prohibitions of slavery, torture and the crime
of genocide or perhaps due process rights and freedom of expression, association or
privacy. More internationally minded responses might mention economic and
social guarantees, including the right to health care, food and education. These
are also internationally protected human rights, although their precise scope – as
well as their recognition by a few countries such as the United States – remains a
subject of genuine debate.
But few observers, if any, would list the rights of authors, creators and inventors as human rights. Yet such rights were recognized at the birth of the
international human rights movement. No less an august statement of foundational
principles than the UDHR includes in its catalogue of rights and freedoms a statement that ‘everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he
Expression – Intellectual Property – Privacy (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2004),
181; J. Griffiths & U. Suthersanen (eds), Copyright and Free Speech: Comparative and
International Analyses (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 474; J. Sterling, World
Copyright Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003), 1357.
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[or she] is the author’.14 The UDHR’s drafting history makes clear that the protection of creators’ rights was no accident, even if the drafters’ precise intentions
remain elusive.15 Support for these rights also finds expression in nearly identical
language in the ICESCR, which makes the UDHR’s economic and social guarantees binding as a matter of treaty law.16
The endorsement of creators’ rights in these documents establishes broad
areas of overlap between human rights law and intellectual property law. But
these texts also suggest many important differences between the two fields –
differences in philosophy, regulatory objectives and the subject matter and scope
of legal protection for the products of human creativity.
In part, these differences are textually engendered. The thrust of multilateral
intellectual property treaties such as the Berne, Rome and Paris Conventions and
the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Agreement is to establish
minimum standards of protection for authors, inventors and other owners of intellectual property products.17 These treaties also recognize the public’s interest in the
distribution of and access to those products. However, they do so principally in the
form of carefully constrained exceptions and limitations to authors’ and inventors’
exclusive rights. Two provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, which set out the treaty’s
‘objectives’ and ‘principles’, indicate that the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the ‘mutual advantage’ of ‘producers and
users of technological knowledge’18 and should ‘promote the public interest in sectors
of vital importance to [members’] socio-economic and technological development’.19 But these provisions are, at least at present, under-enforced and have yet
14. UDHR, supra n. 2, Art. 27(2).
15. J. Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 378 at 220–221. As one scholar recently
observed, although the motivations of governments who favoured inclusion of Art. 27 in the
UDHR are somewhat obscure, the proponents appear to be divided into two camps:
What we know is that the initial strong criticism that intellectual property was not properly
speaking a Human Right or that it already attracted sufficient protection under the regime
of protection afforded to property rights in general was eventually defeated by a coalition
of those who primarily voted in favour because they felt that the moral rights deserved and
needed protection and met the Human Rights standard and those who felt the ongoing
internationalization of copyright needed a boost and that this could be a tool in this respect.

16.

17.

18.
19.
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P. Torremans, ‘Copyright as a Human Right’, in Copyright and Human Rights: Freedom of
Expression – Intellectual Property – Privacy, supra n. 13 at 6.
See M. Green, ‘Drafting History of the Article 15(1)(c) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (9 Oct. 2000), E/C.12/2000/15, online: <www.unhchr.ch/
tbs/doc.nsf/0/872a8f7775c9823cc1256999005c3088/$FILE/G0044899> (last visited: 9 Sep.
2009).
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works [Berne Convention];
International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and
Broadcasting Organizations [Rome Convention]; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights [TRIPS Agreement].
TRIPS Agreement, Art. 7.
Ibid., Art. 8.1.
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to affect the interpretation of TRIPS’ substantive intellectual property provisions by
World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement panels.20
In contrast to this approach, a human rights framework for intellectual property puts the public’s interest front and centre and on an equal footing with property
rights in intangibles. Indeed, the very same ICESCR article that protects the
rights of creators also requires states to protect ‘the right of everyone’ to ‘enjoy
the benefits of scientific progress and its applications’ and to take steps ‘necessary
for the conservation, the development and the diffusion of science and culture’.21
The Committee will eventually elucidate these rights of the public when it issues
general comments interpreting the relevant provisions of the Covenant. In the
discussion that follows, however, the analysis focuses more heavily on the creators’ rights provisions of the ICESCR.
2.1

THE ICESCR COMMITTEE’S GENERAL COMMENT NO. 17

The Committee’s General Comment on creators’ rights reveals the difficulties of
translating the text of Article 15(1)(c) of the Covenant into a coherent framework
for analyzing intellectual property from a human rights perspective. The General
Comment is a lengthy, densely worded and somewhat repetitive document of
57 paragraphs divided into six parts: (1) an introductory section that explains
the basic’s premises of the Committee’s analysis; (2) a close textual reading of
Article 15(1)(c)’s ‘normative content’; (3) a section outlining States parties’ legal
obligations, including general, specific, core and related obligations; (4) an analysis of actions or omissions that would violate the Article; (5) a section on how
creators’ rights are to be implemented at the national level; and (6) a short discussion of the obligations of non-state actors and intergovernmental organizations.
This organizational structure may seem unfamiliar or even mystifying to
intellectual property lawyers, in particular the distinction between ‘legal obligations’ and ‘violations’. But the methodology should be recognizable to foreign
ministries, human rights scholars and others familiar with social and economic
rights, who have followed the Committee’s efforts, in past general comments, to
provide detailed and concrete interpretations of the ICESCR’s many ambiguous
clauses. The Committee has struggled to clarify the meaning of a treaty whose
open-ended provisions are to be realized over time, taking into account the limited
resources available to Member States, particularly to developing countries.22
20. See R. Howse, ‘The Canadian Generic Medicines Panel: A Dangerous Precedent in Dangerous
Times’, Journal of World Intellectual Property 3 (2000): 493 at 502; R. Okediji, ‘Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS Agreement’, Emory International Law
Review 17 (2003): 819 at 914.
21. ICESCR, supra n. 2, Art. 15(1)(b) & 15(2). For a comprehensive analysis, see A. Chapman,
‘Towards an Understanding of the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and its
Applications’, Journal of Human Rights 8 (2009): 1.
22. The ICESCR requires States’ parties to ‘take steps, individually and through international
assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in
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To prevent these limiting principles from emptying the Covenant’s economic,
social and cultural rights of all meaning, the Committee has developed a ‘violations
approach’ that distinguishes ‘core obligations’ – to which all States must give
immediate effect – from other obligations that may be achieved progressively
as additional resources become available.23
These core commitments include obligations to respect, protect and fulfil the
rights of authors. As the Committee explains:
The obligation to respect requires States to refrain from interfering directly or
indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to benefit from the protection of the
moral and material interests of the author. The obligation to protect requires
States to take measures that prevent third parties from interfering with the
moral and material interests of authors. Finally, the obligation to fulfill
requires States to adopt appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary,
judicial, promotional and other measures towards the full realization of article
15, paragraph 1 (c).24
These three core obligations, although framed in the distinctive language of human
rights law, should, on further reflection, seem reasonably familiar to intellectual
property lawyers and scholars. Taken seriatim, they bar States from violating
creators’ material and moral interests, most notably in the form of infringements
by government agencies or officials;25 they mandate ‘effective protection’ of those
interests by means of legislation recognizing creators’ rights and specifying the
modes for their protection, including protection of ‘works which are easily accessible or reproducible through modern communication and reproduction technologies’,26 and they require States to provide judicial and administrative remedies
and other measures for creators to prevent unauthorized uses of their works (i.e.,
injunctions), to recover compensation for such uses (i.e., damages) and, more
broadly, to facilitate creators’ participation in decisions that affect their moral and
material interests.27
These obligations also overlap with certain provisions in intellectual property
treaties, most notably the Berne Convention’s reproduction right, the ‘making
available’ right in the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright
Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty and the enforcement
provisions in the TRIPS Agreement.28 This commonality suggests that States can

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
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the present Covenant by all appropriate means’. ICESCR, supra n. 2, Art. 2(1). These provisions
establish programmatic and flexible commitments that are to be achieved over time.
General Comment No. 3, supra n. 10 at para. 10. See also A. Chapman, ‘Conceptualizing the
Right to Health: A Violations Approach’, Tennessee Law Review 65 (1998): 389.
General Comment, supra n. 11 at para. 28; see also ibid., at paras 44–46 (discussing actions and
omissions that violate these three obligations).
Ibid., at paras 30 and 44.
Ibid., at paras 31 and 45.
See ibid., at paras 34 and 46.
Berne Convention, Art. 9; WIPO Copyright Treaty, Art. 8; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Art.10; TRIPS Agreement, Arts 41–51 & 61.
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meet the requirements of Article 15(1)(c), at least in part, by ratifying international
intellectual property agreements and enacting national copyright and neighbouring
rights laws. The ICESCR’s reporting procedures strongly support this claim.29 Since
the early 1990s, States parties have regularly cited such treaties and laws to demonstrate their compliance with the creators’ rights provisions in the Covenant.30
Notwithstanding the commonalities between these two legal regimes, the Committee’s core obligations approach to creators’ rights leaves many issues unresolved.
Most notably, it does not itself define the content of ‘moral and material interests’
which states are required to ‘respect, protect, and fulfil’. Nor does it specify whether –
and if so, how – a human rights framework for creators’ rights differs from the legal
rules contained in intellectual property treaties and domestic legislation. The next
section considers the Committee’s treatment of these key definitional issues.
2.2

DEVELOPING A DISTINCTIVE HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK
FOR CREATORS’ RIGHTS

The General Comment gives detailed attention to the differences between creators’
moral and material interests and the provisions of intellectual property treaties and
statutes. The Committee begins with the basic and uncontroversial assertion that
the ‘scope of protection’ of creators’ rights in Article 15(1)(c) ‘does not necessarily
coincide with what is termed intellectual property rights under national legislation
or international agreements’.31 But what, precisely, are these differences in scope?

29. ICESCR, supra n. 2, Art. 16 (requiring states to submit periodic ‘reports on the measures they
have adopted and the progress made in achieving the observance of the rights recognized’ in the
Covenant).
30. See, for example, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Implementation of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Third periodic report: Cyprus’
(6 Jun. 1996), E/1994/104/Add.12 at para. 420, online: <www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/
E.1994.104.Add.12.En?Opendocument> (last visited: 9 Sep. 2009) (citing ratification of Berne
Convention and domestic copyright legislation to demonstrate compliance with Art. 15(1)(c));
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Implementation of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Initial report: Israel’ (20 Jan. 1998), E/
1990/5/Add.39(3) at paras 782–788, online: <www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/23a89bf90e53e6ccc1
25656300593189/41e674c4a2affbd480256617004768f5?OpenDocument#PART%20III> (last
visited: 9 Sep. 2009) (discussing evolution and expansion of copyright legislation and ratification
of numerous international agreements to demonstrate compliance with Art. 15(1)(c)); Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Implementation of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Second periodic report: Jordan’ (23 Jul. 1998), E/1990/6/
Add.17 at para. 151, online: <www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/7eb0986e8af3f29c8025672
40056ca4c?Opendocument> (last visited: 9 Sep. 2009) (citing amendments to Copyright Protection Act that conform to international copyright treaties and government’s intent to ratify such
treaties to demonstrate compliance with Art. 15(1)(c)).
31. General Comment, supra n. 11 at para. 2; see also ibid., at para. 3. (‘It is . . . important not
to equate intellectual property rights with the human right recognized in Article 15,
paragraph 1(c).’)
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The Committee first compares foundational principles. It notes that:
human rights are fundamental as they are inherent in the human person as
such, whereas intellectual property rights are first and foremost means by
which States seek to provide incentives for inventiveness and creativity for
the benefit of society as a whole.32
Intellectual property rights are granted by the State, and thus they may also be
taken away by the State. They are temporary, not permanent; they may be
‘revoked, licensed or assigned’;33 and they may be ‘traded, amended or even
forfeited’,34 commensurate with the regulation of a ‘social product [that] has a
social function’.35 By contrast, human rights are enduring, ‘fundamental, inalienable and universal entitlements’.36 These statements reflect a vision of creators’
rights that exist independently of the vagaries of state approval, recognition or
regulation.
Turning from lofty principles to specifics, the Committee identifies several
distinctive features of creators’ rights. For example, Article 15(1)(c) applies only to
‘individuals, and under certain circumstances groups of individuals and communities’.37 Corporations and other legal entities are expressly excluded.38 This represents a profound departure from Anglo-American copyright laws, which have long
recognized that legal entities can enjoy the status of authors of intellectual property
products, for example, of works made for hire.39
Moreover, the legal protections provided to natural persons have a distinctive
human rights flavour. Consider the issue of equality. A cornerstone of intellectual
property treaties is the ‘national treatment’ of foreign authors.40 A human rights
approach also encompasses the principle of equality between domestic and foreign
creators. But it goes much further, including many additional prohibited grounds of
discrimination and mandating equal access to legal remedies for infringement,

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Ibid., at para. 1.
Ibid., at para. 2.
Ibid.
Statement on Human Rights and Intellectual Property, supra n. 9 at para. 4.
Ibid., at para. 6.
General Comment, supra n. 11 at para. 1.
See ibid., at para. 7 (stating that the drafters of ICESCR Art. 15 ‘considered authors of scientific,
literary or artistic productions to be natural persons’); Statement on Human Rights and Intellectual Property, supra n. 9 at para. 6 (contrasting human rights approach authors’ rights with that
of intellectual property regimes which ‘are increasingly focused on protecting business and
corporate interests and investments’).
39. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b). (‘In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom
the work was prepared is considered the author . . . and . . . owns all of the rights comprised in the
copyright.’)
40. See, for example, S. Ricketson, The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works: 1886–1986 (London: Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary College, 1987),
981 at 17–38; D. Vaver, ‘The National Treatment Requirements of the Berne and Universal
Copyright Conventions’ International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright Law
17 (1986): 577.
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including access for ‘vulnerable or marginalized groups’.41 Equality also has a
process dimension, which requires states to provide creators with information ‘on
the structure and functioning of . . . legal or policy regime[s]’, and to facilitate their
participation in ‘any significant decision-making processes with an impact on
their rights and legitimate interests’, either directly or through ‘professional
associations’.42
These comparisons between human rights law and intellectual property law
have some surprising consequences. If the moral and material interests of creators
are fundamental, then the ability of governments to regulate them – either to
protect other human rights or to achieve other social objectives – ought to be
exceedingly narrow. Indeed, the Committee has developed a stringent test for
assessing the legality of state limitations of social and economic rights,43 a
standard that it reaffirms in the General Comment on Article 15(1)(c).
According to this test, governmental restrictions on creators’ rights must be
‘[1] determined by law, [2] in a manner compatible with the nature of these rights,
[3] must pursue a legitimate aim, and [4] and must be strictly necessary for the
promotion of the general welfare in a democratic society’.44 In addition, such
limitations must ‘be [5] proportionate, meaning that [6] the least restrictive measures must be adopted when several types of limitations may be imposed’.45 This
highly restrictive, multi-part standard is far more constraining than the now ubiquitous ‘three-step test’ used to assess the treaty-compatibility of exceptions and
limitations in national copyright laws.46
Yet if restrictions on creators’ rights are to be so rigidly scrutinized (and,
presumably, so rarely upheld), how, then, are governments to strike a balance
between those rights on the one hand and the public’s interest in access to knowledge on the other – a balance that the Committee views as a key feature of
Article 15(1)(c) and that it emphasizes throughout the draft?47 A close parsing
41. General Comment, supra n. 11 at para. 39; see also Statement on Human Rights and Intellectual
Property, supra n. 9 at para. 7 (stating that ‘human rights instruments place great emphasis on
protection against discrimination’, and that the rights guaranteed in the Covenant ‘must be
exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’).
42. General Comment, supra n. 11 at paras 18 and 14.
43. See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No. 14 – The
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)’ (8 2000), E/C.12/2000/4 at para. 28, online:
<www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.Nsf/(symbol)/E.C.12.2000.4.En?OpenDocument> (last visited: 9 Sep.
2009) (discussing government’s burden to demonstrate legality of limitations on the right to
health).
44. General Comment, supra n. 11 at para. 22 [bracketed numbers added].
45. Ibid., at para. 23 [bracketed numbers added].
46. See J. Ginsburg, ‘Toward Supranational Copyright Law? The WTO Panel Decision and the
‘‘Three-Step Test’’ for Copyright Exceptions’, Revue Internationale du Droit d’Auteur
187 (2001): 3; M. Ficsor, ‘How Much of What?: The ‘‘Three-Step Test’’ and Its Application
in Two Recent WTO Dispute Settlement Cases’, Revue Internationale du Droit d’Auteur
192 (2002): 110.
47. See General Comment, supra n. 11 at paras 22, 35 and 39.
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of the text suggests a blueprint from which the Committee may ultimately construct a distinctive human rights framework for intellectual property.
The key to understanding this framework is to identify the purposes of recognizing authors’ moral and material interests as human rights. According to the Committee, such rights serve two essential functions. First, they ‘safeguard the personal
link between authors and their creations and between people or other groups and their
collective cultural heritage’.48 Second, they protect ‘basic material interests which are
necessary to enable authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living’.49
These two statements, which recur throughout the document,50 suggest the
existence of an irreducible core of rights – a zone of personal autonomy in which
creators can achieve their creative potential, control their productive output and
lead independent intellectual lives that are essential requisites of any free society.51
Legal protections in excess of those needed to establish this core zone of autonomy
may serve other salutary social purposes. But they are not required under
Article 15 of the Covenant and, as a result, are not subject to the restrictive exceptions and limitations test quoted above. Stated differently, once a country guarantees creators these two core rights – one moral and the other material – any
additional intellectual property protections the country provides ‘must be balanced
with the other rights recognized in the Covenant’, and must give ‘due consideration’ to ‘the public interest in enjoying broad access to authors’ productions’.52
The ICESCR thus gives each State discretion to eschew these additional legal
protections altogether or, alternatively, to shape them to take account of the
particular economic, social and cultural conditions within its borders.53
Seen from this perspective, creators’ rights are both more and less expansive
than copyright and neighbouring rights regimes. They are more expansive in that
rights within the core zone of autonomy are subject to a far more stringent test for
restrictions than the test applicable to exceptions and limitations in copyright and
48. Ibid., at para. 2. This ‘personal link’ is protected by legislation that enables authors ‘to claim
authorship for their works and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or
other derogatory action in relation to, their works, which would be prejudicial to their honour or
reputation’. Ibid., at para. 41(b). The Committee’s language closely tracks the moral rights
provisions in Art. 6bis of the Berne Convention and in many national laws.
49. Ibid., at para. 2.
50. The Committee repeats variants of the ‘personal link’ language a total of six times, and it
reasserts the ‘adequate standard of living’ formulation no less than nine times – repetitions
that suggest the importance of these concepts to its analysis.
51. Cf. Torremans, supra n. 15 at 5 (drafters of UDHR believed that the best way to avoid recurrence of abuses of science, technology and copyrighted propaganda that occurred during Second
World War would be ‘to recognize that everyone had a share in the benefits and that . . . those
who made valuable contributions were entitled to protection’).
52. General Comment, supra n. 11 at paras 22 and 35. See also ibid., at para. 11 (stating that nothing
in Art. 15(1)(c) prevents states parties from ‘adopting higher protection standards’ in intellectual property treaties or national laws, ‘provided that these standards do not disproportionately
impede the enjoyment by others of their Covenant rights’).
53. See ibid., at para. 18 (stating that ‘the precise application’ of authors’ and inventors’ moral and
material interests ‘will depend on the economic, social and cultural conditions prevailing in a
particular State party’).
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neighbouring rights treaties and national laws. They are less expansive, however,
in that a state need not recognize additional creators’ rights lying outside of this
zone or, if it does recognize such rights, must give appropriate weight to other
human rights, to the public’s interest and to other policy objectives – calibrations
that may permissibly vary from one country to another.
3

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE COLLECTIVE
ADMINISTRATION OF COPYRIGHT:
A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

Where does the collective administration of copyright and neighbouring rights fit
within this emerging legal paradigm? Although the General Comment references
issues of collective administration only sparingly, the Committee’s detailed analysis of Article 15(1)(c) suggests several ways in which CMOs can help to enhance
creators’ rights. However, that analysis also reveals certain collective management
practices that are in tension with the Covenant’s intellectual property provisions.
The discussion below provides an overview of these competing perspectives.
The only express mention of CMOs in the General Comment appears in the
discussion of how to protect creators against infringement by third parties. This is
hardly surprising, inasmuch as the obligation ‘to protect’ is the legal ‘hook’ that the
ICESCR Committee has used to require governments to regulate the activities of
non-state and private actors (in contrast to other Covenant provisions that impose
obligations on state actors alone).54 One method for States to provide such protection is ‘by establishing systems of collective administration of authors’
rights’.55 Collective administration is particularly appropriate, in the Committee’s
view, where works are ‘easily accessible or reproducible through modern communication and reproduction technologies’.56 A second, more oblique reference to
CMOs appears in the discussion of the obligation ‘to fulfil’, which requires governments ‘to promote the realization’ of Article 15(1)(c).57 These conditions
include funding and other affirmative measures to facilitate ‘the formation of
professional associations’, and ‘to ensure the active and informed participation’
of authors in those associations to protect their moral and material interests.58
3.1

CMO ACTIVITIES THAT ENHANCE
CREATORS AND USERS

THE

HUMAN RIGHTS

OF

Although the references to collective administration in the General Comment
are sparse, the document’s overall analysis supports many of the activities that
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Ibid., at para. 31.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., at para. 46.
Ibid., at paras 34 and 46.
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CMOs perform. In fact, where prevailing modes of exploiting protected works
make it difficult or impossible for authors to control their creations on an individualized basis, CMOs are likely to be essential features of human rights-compliant,
twenty-first century copyright systems.
Distilled to their essence, CMOs enable copyright owners to enforce their
rights where the transaction costs of negotiating individual licenses and pursuing
individual enforcement preclude mutually beneficial transactions with users.59
In particular, CMOs perform two functions that the Committee identifies as necessary for the ‘effective protection’ of creators’ rights: (1) they prevent infringement by third parties, and (2) they collect and distribute compensation for
authorized uses of protected works.60 CMOs also make it possible for copyright
owners to retain exclusive control over their creative output in situations in which
user groups are likely to pressure legislators to convert such control into the lesser
right to receive remuneration from compulsory licenses.61
In addition to these core functions, CMOs also carry out a variety of ancillary
activities that provide human rights benefits. These include representing the interests of creators before legislatures and administrative agencies, providing social
services such as health benefits and pensions for authors, and promoting creativity
through awards, prizes and fellowships.62 By engaging in these additional functions, CMOs not only assist States in complying with Article 15(1)(c) but also help
them to satisfy the obligations of other United Nations (UN) treaties.63 It is not

59. See L. Helfer, ‘World Music on a U.S. Stage: A Berne/TRIPS and Economic Analysis of the
Fairness in Music Licensing Act’, Boston University Law Review 80 (2000): 93 at 110. (‘These
[transaction] costs include identifying numerous potential licensees in disparate locations,
negotiating with them over payment terms, monitoring compliance with each licensing agreement and taking legal action to prevent infringements.’)
60. See General Comment, supra n. 11 at paras 31 and 45; see also Helfer, ibid., at 110 (stating that
CMOs ‘reduce transaction costs in several significant ways. They provide a clearinghouse for
users seeking licenses, they collect and distribute revenues to the songwriters, composers and
publishers who are their members, they monitor the activities of licensees and they take enforcement action where necessary to vindicate their members’ rights’.).
61. See Ficsor, supra n. 12 at 17 (arguing against pressures to abolish exclusive rights and convert
them to a ‘mere right to remuneration’ and proposing collective management of rights as an
alternative).
62. See, for example, ibid., at 149–50; Sinacore-Guinn, supra n. 1 at 211–212.
63. The UN Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions,
adopted 20 Oct. 2005 and entered into force 18 Mar. 2007, recommends that States parties adopt
measures to encourage the ‘creation, production, dissemination, distribution and enjoyment
of . . . domestic cultural activities, goods and services’ and those ‘aimed at nurturing and supporting artists and others involved in the creation of cultural expressions’. Article 6(2)(b) and
6(2)(g). The Convention also encourages States parties ‘to create in their territory an environment which encourages individuals and social groups to create, produce, disseminate and have
access to their own cultural expressions [and] to have access to diverse cultural expressions from
within their territory as well as from other countries of the world’. Article 7(1)(a) and 7(1)(b).
CMOs could serve as vehicles for helping States to achieve these objectives.
CMOs could also assist States parties to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, adopted 13 Dec. 2006 and entered into force 3 May 2008, to meet their obligation to
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surprising, therefore, that several States parties to the ICESCR have referred
favourably to legislation establishing collective management systems in their
reports to the Committee.64
‘take all appropriate steps . . . to ensure that laws protecting intellectual property rights do not
constitute an unreasonable or discriminatory barrier to access by persons with disabilities to
cultural materials’. Art. 30(3). For example, CMOs may facilitate – either on their own or in
response to government incentives – the conversion of copyrighted materials into media accessible to persons with disabilities, and the distribution of those materials to such persons by
means of blanket licensing agreements.
64. See, for example, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Fourth Periodic
Reports: Mexico, Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights’ (25 Feb. 2005), E/C.12/4/Add.16 at para. 883, <www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/
898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/5e44a3f92c77e707c12570ab0059563c/$FILE/
G0540525.pdf> (last visited: 9 Sep. 2009) (referring to ‘the National Copyright institute
authoriz[ing] the formation and operation of collectively managed societies’); Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Initial Reports: Slovenia, Implementation of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (26 May 2004), E/1990/5/
Add.62 at para. 915, online: <www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/
ba2445d14057821cc1257067003238cd/$FILE/G0441926.pdf> (last visited: 9 Sep. 2009) (discussing the difficulty of establishing ‘collective organizations for creative (copyright) workers’); Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Initial Reports: China, Implementation of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (4 Mar. 2004), E/1990/5/
Add. 59 at paras 234, 258, <www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/
9fbfe806f28f1eb4c1256f4a004bc5d8/$FILE/G0440656.pdf> (last visited: 9 Sep. 2009) (referring
to ‘collectively administering copyright’ as a means of ‘protect the cultural rights of [China’s]
citizens’ and discussing China’s ‘first institution for the collective management of intellectual
property rights’); Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Fourth Periodic Reports:
Norway, Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights’ (26 Feb. 2004), E/C.12/4/Add.14 at para. 461, <www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/
898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/4b7cddf05a594cbac1256f42004d4d3b/$FILE/G0442518.pdf>
(last visited: 9 Sep. 2009) (referring to laws created ‘to provide for collective arrangements
whereby remuneration is paid through the state budget to funds administered by various
copyright organizations’); Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Third Periodic
Reports: Chile, Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights’ (14 Jul. 2003), E/1994/104/Add. 26 at paras 877–881, <www.unhchr.ch/tbs/
doc.nsf/898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/91ef5d1ff1e1525cc1256f16004aa896/$FILE/
G0343617.pdf> (last visited: 9 Sep. 2009) (discussing the emergence of collective management
societies protecting rights in the music sector, and protecting rights of image artists, playwrights
and screenwriters, and actors); Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Initial
Reports: Lithuania, Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights’ (9 Dec. 2002), E/1990/5/Add. 55 at paras 657–658, 667, <www.unhchr.ch/tbs/
doc.nsf/898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/1eaf91a2843227dfc1256e78004a2b55/$FILE/
G0246237.pdf> (last visited: 9 Sep. 2009) (discussing the importance of collective administration of copyright and referring to the Lithuanian laws and agency that govern collective
administration of copyright); Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Initial
Reports: Greece, Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (23 Oct. 2002), E/1990/5/Add. 56 at paras 670, 678, online: <www.unhchr.ch/tbs/
doc.nsf/898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/fc0f67050f79d862c1256d5f00565ee6/$FILE/
G0245183.pdf> (last visited: 9 Sep. 2009) (discussing both self-managed and publicly managed
collective management organizations); Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
‘Initial Reports: Bolivia, Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
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Collective management of copyright also enhances the rights of consumers
under Article 15 of the Covenant, although the benefits are more equivocal than
those accruing to creators.65 Blanket licenses, the mainstay of so many CMOs,
authorize the unlimited use of all works within the organization’s repertoire for a
specific period of time. Such licenses avoid the time and expense of negotiating
specific uses for specific works. For users who require immediate access to a broad
array of creative consent, blanket licenses also promote spontaneity in exploiting
protected works.66 For those with more particularized needs, however, the benefits
of blanket licenses are less clear, because the ‘all or nothing’ bargains they embody
compel consumers to purchase more works at higher prices than they would
otherwise be willing to pay.67 Whether the aggregate benefits to the public outweigh the costs depends in part on the extent to which governments regulate CMO
licensing practices, a subject addressed in greater detail below.
3.2

CMO ACTIVITIES THAT DETRACT
CREATORS AND USERS

FROM THE

HUMAN RIGHTS

OF

Some form of collective management of creators’ rights is essential to ensure compliance with Article 15(1)(c) where the transaction costs of individual licenses are
high. Not all of the functions that CMOs perform are human rights enhancing,
however. On the contrary, the monopoly position that CMOs enjoy – both in relation
and Cultural Rights’ (9 Dec. 1999), E/1990/5/Add.44 at para. 506, <www.unhchr.ch/tbs/
doc.nsf/898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/5e41566ff361c211c12569220048364e/$FILE/
G9946227.pdf> (last visited: 9 Sep. 2009) (discussing the Copyright Act’s ‘establishment
of societies of authors and artists, with a view to assuming responsibility for the administration
of their property rights’); Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Second periodic reports: Belgium, Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights’ (5 Mar. 1998), E/1990/6/Add. 18, <www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/
9b1e64652f3a69cc8025678a00318bfb?OpenDocument> (last visited: 9 Sep. 2009) (describing
provisions of new copyright law that ‘provides for the formation of royalty management companies (or collective management)’ which ‘makes it obligatory for these societies to intervene to
ensure that certain types of remuneration are received’).
65. See generally, G. Davies, ‘The Public Interest in the Collective Administration of Rights’
Copyright (March, 1989), 81 at 84–87.
66. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (1979), 441 U.S. 1 at 20 (United States Supreme Court), <caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court¼us&vol¼441&
invol¼1> (last visited: 9 Sep. 2009). (‘Most users want unplanned, rapid, and indemnified
access to any and all of the repertory of compositions, and the owners want a reliable method
of collecting for the use of their copyrights.’) This need for immediate access is one reason why
blanket licenses are the norm for public performance rights for musical works. See Ficsor, supra
n. 12 at 37–48 and Sinacore-Guinn, supra n. 1 at 747–768.
67. See A. Katz, ‘The Potential Demise of Another Natural Monopoly: New Technologies and the
Future of Collective Administration of Copyrights’ (May 2004), U Toronto Law and Economics
Research Paper No. 04-02, <http://ssrn.com/abstract¼547802> or <law.bepress.com/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article¼1034&context¼alea> (last visited: 9 Sep. 2009); Stanley M. Besen,
S. Kirkby & S. Salop, ‘An Economic Analysis of Copyright Collectives’, Virginia Law Review
78 (1992): 383 at 393.
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to users and, in some cases, in their dealings with the creators who are their members –
generate incentives for the organizations to behave in ways that limit the human rights
of both groups. These incentives highlight the need for governments to regulate
(1) the licenses that CMOs offer to users, (2) the relationships between CMOs and
their members and (3) the relationships among the members themselves.68
As to the first issue, governments in nearly all countries in which CMOs
operate exercise some form of regulatory control over licensing practices to prevent abuse of their dominant positions. The source, extent and enforcement of these
regulations vary widely, however. In some countries, copyright laws limit CMO
activities. In others, administrative agencies, tribunals or other specialized regulatory bodies monitor CMO activities and adjudicate complaints by licensees.
In yet other nations, users seek relief from the courts by filing competition or
antitrust claims against CMOs, leading to judicial monitoring of licensing practices
in the form of detailed consent decrees.69
How do human rights principles inform government regulation of CMOs? As
explained above, a human rights framework for intellectual property requires a
balance between the rights of creators and the rights of the public. In striking this
balance, ‘the private interests of authors and inventors should not be unduly advantaged and the public interest in enjoying broad access to new knowledge should be
given due consideration’.70 Regulation of licensing practices is one way to avoid such
undue advantage. According to the ICESCR Committee, states must prevent private
parties from imposing ‘unreasonably high’ license fees or royalties that interfere with
other rights in the Covenant, including the right to education and to culture.71
The consequences of this statement for government regulation of CMOs are
somewhat uncertain, however. The Committee provides no guidance for determining when royalties are unreasonably high. In addition, the examples that it identifies as potentially problematic – high costs of access to essential medicines, plant
seeds, schoolbooks and other learning materials72 – do not include the works of
entertainment or popular culture that are often subject to collective management.
Nevertheless, the Committee’s reference to the price that consumers pay to access
copyrighted works as part of the overall balance of creators’ rights suggests that
States must provide some form of meaningful regulation of CMO licensing practices to comply with their obligations under the Covenant.
68. Cf. Sinacore-Guinn, supra n. 1 at 237. (‘The disadvantages of private [CMOs] fall into two
general categories: problems in relationship to the organization’s activities on the creator’s
behalf and problems related to the relationship between the organization and the creator.’)
69. See Ficsor, supra n. 12 at 142–44; Helfer, supra n. 59 at 110–111 and n. 64; see also S. Helm,
‘Intellectual Property in Transition Economies: Assessing the Latvian Experience’, Fordham
Intellectual Property Media & Entertainment Law Journal 14 (2003): 119 at 200–201 (discussing supervisory functions performed by Ministry of Culture in relation to Latvian copyright
collectives).
70. General Comment, supra n. 11 at para. 35; see also Statement on Human Rights and Intellectual
Property, supra n. 9 at para. 17 (similar quotation).
71. General Comment, supra n. 11 at para. 35.
72. Ibid.

91

Laurence R. Helfer
The second and third areas of human rights scrutiny concern the relationship
between CMOs and their members, and among their members inter se. Two provisions of the General Comment are relevant to these issues: the restriction of creators’ rights to natural persons and the more capacious equality norms that the
ICESCR endorses.
The exclusion of corporations and other business entities from the rights
protected in Article 15(1)(c) suggests that States parties must give special solicitude to individual creators who are compelled, either by law or as a practical
matter, to enforce their rights through collective management systems. This is
particularly true for CMOs organized in a form other than an authors’ association,
in which creators may exercise somewhat greater control.73 Government supervision to ensure equal treatment of individual creators encompasses a broad range of
issues, including the terms of CMO membership, transfers of rights from individuals to the collective, the distribution of royalties and participation by copyright
owners in CMO decisions that affect their interests.74
Corporate and equality issues also arise in another area of CMO governance –
the relationship between individual creators and business owners who belong to the
same CMO. Several scholars have noted the growing conflicts between these two
classes of rights holders from the agglomeration of intellectual property-related
businesses and the concomitant expansion of corporate influence over CMO
decision making.75 Although principles of ‘equity’ and ‘solidarity’ among rights
holders are enshrined in many CMO charters, the recent erosion of these principles
highlights the potential of the Covenant’s broader non-discrimination rules to bolster
equality for individual creators in their relations with corporate rights owners.76
4

TWO HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS OF COLLECTIVE
ADMINISTRATION: MANDATORY MEMBERSHIP
AND PROMOTING NATIONAL CULTURE

The preceding section provided a thumbnail sketch of a human rights framework
for the collective administration of copyright and neighbouring rights, emphasizing both the benefits and the detriments of CMOs for achieving the balanced
73. See Sinacore-Guinn, supra n. 1 at 235–236 (discussing distinction between ‘membership organizations’ and ‘corporate non-membership organizations’).
74. See Ficsor, supra n. 12 at 21, 132 and 143. Where a CRO is a public entity – as is often true in
developing countries – the government is required to address these issues as part of its obligation
‘to respect’ the rights of creators. See General Comment, supra n. 11 at paras 30 and 44.
75. See R. Wallis, C. Baden-Fuller, M. Kretschmer & G. Klimis, ‘Contested Collective Administration of Intellectual Property Rights in Music: The Challenge to the Principles of Reciprocity
and Solidarity’, European Journal of Communication 14 (1999): 5 at 6–8 (analysing the consequences of increasing concentration of ownership and integration in the music industry);
G. Jokhadze, ‘The Big Ones of the Music Industry: Copyright and Human Rights Aspects of
the Music Business’, in Expanding The Horizons of Human Rights Law, ed. I. Ziemele (Boston:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), 290 at 237–238 (same).
76. See Wallis et al., supra n. 75 at 14–15, 19 and 22–23.
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protection of creators’ rights indicated by the ICESCR Committee. This section
contains a more detailed analysis of two legal and policy questions with important
human rights implications: (1) whether participation in CMOs should be voluntary
or mandatory and (2) whether such organizations should promote national culture
in addition to the licensing, enforcement and royalty distribution activities that
comprise the core of their work.
4.1

SHOULD MEMBERSHIP
OR VOLUNTARY?

IN

CMOS

BE

MANDATORY

The question of whether creators should be required to join CMOs has long vexed
intellectual property commentators. On the one hand, mandatory membership, and
the exclusion of other modes of exploitation it implies, help to achieve the economic efficiencies and practical benefits that justify collective administration in
the first instance, such as issuing blanket licenses and reducing the costs of negotiations, enforcement actions and royalty distributions. However, mandatory participation in a CMO also raises serious concerns for creators. In its most extreme
incarnation, compulsory membership precludes creators from issuing individual
licenses for their own works, compels participation in an organization whose
policies they may disfavour (and that they may be legally or practically precluded
from modifying) and requires affiliation with other creators with whom they may
not wish to associate.77
Similar concerns led the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) to find
‘closed-shop agreements’ – contracts that require employees to join a trade union
as a condition of gaining or maintaining employment – to violate the right to
freedom of association.78 Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights
guarantees freedom of association, ‘including the right to form and to join trade
unions’.79 It does not, however, expressly mention a right not to associate. Nevertheless, in Sørensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark, the ECHR found that compelling
an employee to join a union impermissibly interfered with the rights guaranteed by
Article 11.80
In reaching this result, the court explained that States have a positive obligation to intervene in private employment relationships to secure the rights
77. For a discussion of these competing viewpoints, see Sinacore-Guinn, supra n. 1 at 289–303. For
an analysis of when compulsory membership is compatible with international copyright and
neighbouring rights agreements, see M. Ficsor, ‘Collective Management: Voluntary?
Extended? Obligatory? International Norms and the ‘‘Acquis Communautaires’’’ (2003), Eleventh Annual Conference on International Intellectual Property Law and Policy, Fordham
University School of Law, New York City, 24–25 Apr. 2003.
78. Sørensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark, Application Nos 52562/99 & 52620/99, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2006) (Sørensen).
79. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 Nov. 1950, ETS No. 5 (European Convention), Art. 11.
80. Sørensen, supra n. 78, para. 36.
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guaranteed in Article 11.81 In reviewing this intervention, the ECHR considers
whether the government has struck ‘a fair balance . . . between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole’,82 weighing the State’s
justification for permitting closed shop agreements against the extent to which
they frustrate an employee’s right to freedom of association.83 In Sørensen and
Rasmussen, the ECHR found that most States parties to the European Convention
no longer support closed shop agreements, suggesting that the agreements were
no longer ‘an indispensible tool for the effective enjoyment of trade union
freedoms’.84 In light of this growing regional trend, the court found that Denmark’s
interest in maintaining closed shop agreements was insufficient to outweigh the
harm to the employees’ freedom of association.85
Although labour unions and CMOs are not directly analogous, the human
rights concerns raised by compulsory membership in a labour unions may have
repercussions for compulsory membership in CMOs. Both closed shop agreements
and compulsory CMO membership affect a individual’s livelihood. However,
whereas closed shop agreements threaten the loss of employment for failure to
join a union, mandatory membership in a CMO helps to ensure that creators receive
revenue from the licensing of their works.
Nevertheless, there are strong arguments that mandatory membership in
CMOs impermissibly interferes with freedom of association, at least in industrialized countries. In particular, compulsory membership rules are an overly broad
means of advancing society’s interest in facilitating access to creative works
through a single licensing mechanism. The obvious efficiency gains of collective
rights management will convince most rights holders to join CMOs voluntarily.
These incentives are strong enough to enable CMOs to withstand the modest
diminution of membership and revenue that would result from offering creators
an exit option, a choice among multiple organizations or permitting individual or
open-content licensing.86
The application of the ECHR’s balancing test to mandatory CMO membership
may differ, however, for developing countries with nascent creative industries.
Many developing countries have only limited experience in encouraging creativity
within their borders and in promoting the licensing of copyrighted works. As one
commentator has explained:

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
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Ibid., at para. 57.
Ibid., at para. 58.
Ibid., at para. 58.
Ibid., at para. 75.
Ibid.
Cf. D. Gervais, ‘Collective Management of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights in Canada: An
International Perspective’, Canadian Journal of Law and Technology 1 (2002): 21 at 26, online:
<cjlt.dal.ca/vol1_no2/pdfarticles/gervais.pdf>, 9 Sep. 2009. (‘In the same way that rightsholders
should be free to decide whether they want to be part of a collective scheme (except perhaps
where individual management is impossible), they should be free to create new Collective
Management Organizations.’)
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[T]he national cultural industries in these developing nations are frequently
underdeveloped and the national repertoire underutilized. . . . From the government’s perspective, and that of many creators as well, [initiatives to promote creativity] will be weakened to the extent that a significant number of
national creators fail to participate in this collective effort. Furthermore, in
many such countries, the number of creators involved is relatively small and so
lacking in income that there is little potential for the native industry to develop
without a coordinated comprehensive (and often subsidized) governmental
effort.87
Mandating membership in CMOs is an appropriate response to these economic and
social conditions. It centralizes public and private efforts to promote local culture
and creativity in a single entity, enhancing their effectiveness. Such an approach is
also consistent with a recognition of the special needs of developing countries that
the ICESCR Committee emphasizes in its General Comment.88 Admittedly, the
freedom of choice and associational rights of individual creators are constrained
by compulsory membership.89 Under the conditions described earlier, however,
in which collective management not only generates royalties but also helps to
build the requisites of a national copyright culture, restrictions on the rights of
individual creators can be justified under the stringent standard that the ICESCR
Committee endorses as well as under the ECHR’s balancing test in the Sørensen
and Rasmussen case.90 As economic and cultural conditions in developing
countries improve, however, such restrictions will become increasingly difficult
for governments to justify.
For many years, freedom of association concerns relating to mandatory CMO
membership were of mostly theoretical interest.91 As a practical matter, certain
modes of exploiting protected works required collective action, and creators had
little choice but to license these works collectively rather than individually. It thus
made little difference whether the government formally mandated CMO
membership.92 Recently, however, two legal and technological developments have
87. Sinacore-Guinn, supra n. 1 at 291. See also E. Nwauche, ‘Intellectual Property Rights,
Copyright and Development Policy in a Developing Country: Options For Sub Saharan African
Countries’ (2003), Copyright Workshop, Zimbabwe International Book Fair, 30 Jul. 2003, at
10, <www.kopinor.org/content/download/1777/13422/file/zibf.pdf> (last visited: 9 Sep. 2009).
(‘Apart from South Africa where the collecting societies began operations in the sixties, most of
the other [Sub-Saharan African] collecting societies are of a recent origin.’)
88. See General Comment, supra n. 11 at para. 40.
89. The Covenant protects these associational rights expressly. See ICESCR, supra n. 2, Art. 8(1)(a)
(recognizing the right ‘of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of his
choice . . . for the promotion and protection of his economic and social interests’).
90. See General Comment, supra n. 11 at paras 22–23; Sørensen, supra n. 78, at para. 58; see also
supra, Part I.B.
91. Sinacore-Guinn, supra n. 1 at 289 (stating that the issue of ‘voluntary versus nonvoluntary
collective affiliation’ is ‘rarely addressed directly in the legal literature or by governmental
authorities’).
92. World Intellectual Property Organization, ‘Collective Administration of Copyright and Neighboring Rights’ (1989), Copyright 309 at 342 (WIPO, Collective Administration).
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increased the salience of analyzing mandatory participation from a human rights
perspective.
The first development concerns online licensing of copyrighted works. Digital
media and Internet technologies create new opportunities for exploiting protected
works, opportunities that collective rights management can greatly facilitate. But
the ease of digital communications, the pervasive labelling of works with rights
management information, and the security provided by technological protection
measures also enable creators to negotiate with users directly and to license their
works themselves.93
The practical feasibility of issuing individual licenses substantially raises the
stakes associated with CMO membership rules. Many, perhaps most, creators will
continue to manage their works collectively. For these individuals, it may seem of
little consequence whether membership is mandatory or permissive. But the
collective enterprise as a whole may suffer if rights owners are not required to
participate.94 This is particularly true if global media companies that control large
portfolios of protected works withdraw them from the system of collective
licensing.95 It is also a risk if popular creators or performing artists opt out of the
collective to demand higher royalties than a CMO can negotiate on their behalf as
part of a blanket license.96 In either case, it is smaller and less well known
individual creators who may suffer.97
Whether and to what extent these dark predictions come to pass affects
whether state regulation of CMO membership rules is consistent with international
human rights law. If a mass exodus of corporate rights owners or popular artists
from the collective denies other creators the opportunity ‘to enjoy an adequate
standard of living’ from their creative endeavours,98 a human rights framework
may require governments to favour exclusive participation in such organizations
93. See C. Graber, C. Govoni, M. Girsberger & M. Nenova (eds), Digital Rights Management: The
end of Collecting Societies? (Berne: Staempfli Publishers Ltd., 2005), 251; Ficsor, supra n. 12
at 96–106; Gervais, supra n. 86 at 21.
94. A. Dietz, ‘Legal Regulation of Collective Management of Copyright (Collecting Societies Law)
in Western and Eastern Europe’, Journal of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A. 49 (2002): 897 at
911 (noting arguments that ‘an unduly rapid transition from collective management to
individual management of rights [in digital networks] could disturb the established, socially
balanced system of distribution’).
95. Wallis, supra n. 75 at 21–22 (discussing the ‘threat to the stability of collecting societies’ from
the withdrawal of multinationals’ repertoires from collective administration).
96. See Ficsor, supra n. 12 at 97–98 (noting this possibility but arguing that it is counterproductive
for individual creators and for the collective as a whole).
97. As one group of commentators recently stated:
The threats [from recent challenges to CMOs] are greatest to those who earn modest
royalties, especially from companies not linked with [major multinational conglomerates]. These artists . . . will find themselves squeezed twice. First, the collective agencies
may ignore them, as their needs are costly to service. Second, the companies which
represent them will have to be more aggressive if they are to survive.
Wallis, supra n. 75 at 25.
98. General Comment, supra n. 11 at para. 2.

96

Collective Management of Copyrights and Human Rights
and to refocus regulation on providing members with the means to hold CMOs
accountable and to participate in CMO decisions that affect their interests.99 These
concerns could also justify government-mandated CMO membership rules under
the ECHR’s balancing test. On the other hand, individual and collective licensing
may coexist harmoniously in certain media. Where they do, a human rights framework weighs strongly in favour of giving creators the freedom to decide whether to
license their works individually or as part of the collective.
A second trend that may alter the calculus of whether CMO memberships
should be mandatory or voluntary concerns the rise of Creative Commons and
similar organizations that promote open content licensing of copyrighted works.100
Open content licenses authorize third parties to exercise some or all of a creator’s
exclusive rights without remuneration for such uses. In doing so, they facilitate
sharing of ideas, information and protected content between authors and users and
directly promote ‘the public interest in enjoying broad access to new knowledge’ –
two goals endorsed by Article 15 of the Covenant and by the ICESCR
Committee.101 Some advocates of open content licensing also make the more
controversial assertion, that a limited relinquishing of exclusive rights promote
creativity more effectively than existing proprietary models.102
Whatever the merits of this claim, there can be little doubt that open content
licenses challenge the economic interests of CMOs.103 They thus create potential
conflicts between CMOs and their members that raise human rights concerns. One
recent proposal would resolve these conflicts by allowing creators to assign all of
their works to CMOs on a nonexclusive basis, thereby preserving the right to
distribute those same works through open content licenses.104 This approach
accords with the diversity of arrangements (many of them nonexclusive) by which

99. Ibid., at paras 18 and 34.
100. See, for example, ‘Creative Commons’, <creativecommons.org/> (last visited: 9 Sep. 2009); A
Guide to Open Content Licenses, online: <pzwart.wdka.hro.nl/mdr/research/lliang/open_content_
guide/> (last visited: 9 Sep. 2009); Open Content, online: <opencontent.org/> (last visited: 9 Sep.
2009); Open Music, online: <openmusic.linuxtag.org/modules/freecontent/content/openmusic/>
(last visited: 9 Sep. 2009).
101. ICESCR, supra n. 2, Art. 15(2) (requiring states parties to take steps ‘necessary for the conservation, the development and the diffusion of science and culture’); General Comment,
supra n. 11 at para. 35 (asserting that states parties must give ‘due consideration’ to ‘the
public interest in enjoying broad access’ the production of authors).
102. See, for example, A Guide to Open Content Licenses, supra n. 100 (discussing models of
collaborative production that are alternatives to copyright).
103. See Gervais, supra n. 86 at 28 and fn. 77 (reproducing statement by a Canadian collecting
society urging authors to ‘be prudent in granting free permissions’, because the frequent grant
of such permissions could be interpreted ‘as a lack of support for the collective licensing
system’, and urging authors to forward all requests for free licenses to the CMO for
processing).
104. See [A2k] Comments: Art. 8.1, <lists.essential.org/pipermail/a2k/2005-May/000360.html>
(last visited: 9 Sep. 2009) (proposing for inclusion in new ‘Access to Knowledge Treaty’ a
provision to ‘ensure that copyright holders that are members of collecting societies are entitled
to make available individual works outside of the framework of collecting societies’).
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creators currently transfer their rights to CMOs.105 But it elides the difficulties that
widespread open content licensing would engender for collectives and for the
human rights benefits they produce for creators and users.106
More nuanced solutions are needed to balance the competing interests at stake.
These could include requiring creators to transfer exclusive rights to the collective
for an initial term of years or authorizing transfers on a work-by-work basis,
thereby preserving some works for open content licensing. A more comprehensive
solution might involve adapting the extended collective licensing system used in
Scandinavian countries. Under this system, ‘as soon as a substantial number of
rights holders of a certain category agree to participate in a collective scheme, the
scheme is automatically extended not only to other national rights holders in works
of the same category, but to all foreign ones as well’.107 Creators are not required to
participate, however, and they may opt out of the collective system or veto the use
of their works.108 Such an approach places the burden on creators to exclude their
works from the collective.
4.2

SHOULD CROS PROMOTE NATIONAL CULTURE?

In addition to collecting and distributing royalties on behalf of their members and
enforcing their rights against licensees and infringers, many CMOs engage in a
broad range of social, educational, and cultural activities. In the cultural field, these
activities seek to ‘promot[e] the creation of new works and the use of all national
works’ through grants to creators; competitions, awards and scholarships; workshops and educational programmes; and the promotion of works by local artists,
creators and performers.109 In some countries, these cultural activities are mandated by statute; in others they are permitted but not required by law; and in still
others, cultural promotions are wholly private ventures.110
Commentators continue to debate the legality and wisdom of entrusting CMOs
with the promotion of culture. Those who favour such a policy argue that cultural
activities provide at least an indirect benefit to CMO members by encouraging
public respect for creators and their works. Cultural promotions also provide additional incentives for creativity (especially by new or impecunious authors) and
highlight classes of works that would otherwise go unnoticed or underappreciated
by consumers.111
Opponents counter that authorizing CMOs to perform promotional activities
conflicts with creators’ exclusive rights and risks diminishing the public legitimacy
of CMOs. As to the first issue, opponents claim that authors give only nominal
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
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consent for expenditures on cultural activities by joining an organization that
already engages in such practices. As to the second issue, the monopoly licensing
powers that CMOs possess already generate suspicion of collective entities in the
eyes of user groups. ‘In the face of such suspicion, it is appropriate that the
collective only undertake to do that which is absolutely essential to its primary
mission: the administration of creative rights.’112
To balance these competing perspectives, the amount deducted for cultural
activities has remained generally 10% or less of royalties collected.113 Within the
last decade, however, some CMOs have urged their fellow organizations to reduce
or even eliminate the deduction for cultural activities, both to maximize the distribution of royalties and to ensure that foreign authors do not subsidize the promotion of culture in other countries.114 This trend has been most pronounced
among CMOs operating in common law countries; it has made less headway in
European collection societies.115
The cultural activities that CMOs perform – and the debates over their
propriety – have never been assessed in human rights terms. Commentators analyzing the issue from an intellectual property perspective make a strong case that
the promotion of culture by CMOs can weaken creators’ exclusive rights. But a
human rights framework proceeds from a very different premise. So long as CMOs
perform their core functions and provide sufficient remuneration for authors
‘to secure . . . an adequate standard of living’ from their creative endeavours,
then the state – by assisting CMOs to perform these functions – has complied
with Article 15(1)(c)’s mandate to protect creators’ ‘basic material interests’.116
Having satisfied this obligation, however, any additional royalties that the
organizations collect need not be distributed to their members. Such royalties
fall outside the zone of autonomy mandated by Article 15(1)(c) and within the
scope of a state’s discretion to weigh creators’ private interests in receiving additional remuneration against other cultural goals that benefit the public at large.117 It
is a proper exercise of this discretion for States parties to delegate to CMOs a broad
array of functions ‘necessary for the conservation, the development and the diffusion of science and culture’.118 Such functions undoubtedly include the promotional activities that CMOs already perform. And there is no reason – from a human

112. Sinacore-Guinn, supra n. 1 at 499.
113. WIPO, Collective Administration, supra n. 92 at 348.
114. See Competition Commission of the United Kingdom, ‘Performing rights: A report on the
supply in the UK of the services of administering performing rights and film synchronisation
rights’ (1 Feb. 1996) at 141, <www.competition-commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/1996/
fulltext/378c9.pdf> (last visited: 9 Sep. 2009). The full version of the report can be viewed
online: <www.competition-commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/1996/378performing.htm#full>
(last visited: 9 Sep. 2009).
115. Ibid.
116. General Comment, supra n. 11 at para. 2.
117. See supra Part 2.2.
118. ICESCR, supra n. 2, Art. 15(2).
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rights perspective, at least – why funding for such activities should be limited to
10% of royalties collected.119
Of course, nothing in the ICESCR requires states parties to appoint CMOs as
their agents to conserve, develop and diffuse national culture. Many other options
are available, including the creation of educational, not-for-profit or other
specialized entities dedicated to studying, preserving and disseminating cultural
products.120 These activities may be undertaken by government agencies directly
or by private actors operating with state support.
Alternatives that decouple the promotion of culture from CMOs’ core functions have the advantage of respecting the wishes of creators who object to cultural
subsidies but who are required, either by law or as a practical matter, to participate
in the collective administration of their works.121 However, such alternatives
require governments to fund the promotion of culture from public revenues that
are already overburdened. Officials may therefore be tempted to place the financial
burden of promoting culture on CMOs rather than diminish the resources available
for more pressing government programmes, including those implementing other
social and economic rights protected by the Covenant.122
One final area of CMO cultural activities requires separate analysis – the
promotion of national culture in developing countries with funds acquired from
licensing the works of foreign creators. Commentators have long noted the tension
between cultural promotion activities by CMOs and the national treatment rules of
intellectual property treaties. Because foreign rights holders do not benefit from
most cultural programmes undertaken in other nations, the argument goes, they do
not receive same treatment that domestic rights owners enjoy.123 Consequently,
‘deductions for cultural activities are only allowed if . . . foreigners, directly or
indirectly (thought their representatives) approve them’.124
This issue continues to be debated in intellectual property circles. According
to one influential report by the WIPO, the Berne and Rome Conventions categorically preclude Member States from imposing cultural deductions on foreign creators in their national laws, at least with respect to exclusive rights protected by
119. The more complex legal issues raised by funding cultural activities with the royalties
collective on behalf of foreign creators are discussed in greater detail below.
120. See Sinacore-Guinn, supra n. 1 at 505–507 (discussing alternative methods for promoting
culture by entities other than CMOs).
121. See supra Part 4.1.
122. ICESCR, supra n. 2, Art. 2(1) (requiring states parties to ‘take steps . . . to the maximum of
[their] available resources’ to fully realize the rights in the Covenant). See also S. Chavula,
‘Cultural, Social and Economic Aspects of Authors’ Rights: Legal and Practical Challenges in
a Developing Country’, Kopinor 25th Anniversary International Symposium, Oslo, Norway,
20 May 2005 at 5, <www.kopinor.org/content/download/2136/15475/file/Legal%20and%
20practical%20challenges-kopinor.pdf> (last visited: 9 Sep. 2009) (stating that ‘[c]ulture is
generally . . . given very low priority in the national budget [of Malawi] as compared to health,
agriculture and education’).
123. Sinacore-Guinn supra n. 1 at 491 and 502; WIPO, Collective Administration, supra n. 92,
at 348.
124. WIPO, Collective Administration, supra n. 92 at 348.
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those treaties.125 But a more recent WIPO study, written by a leading scholar of
collective management of copyright and neighbouring rights, suggests a way to
resolve the national treatment issue voluntarily in the case of developing countries.
According to the study, the ‘foreign partner organizations [of developing country
CMOs] may find it appropriate to allow an even higher level of cultural and social
deductions [than ten percent] in order to assist those organizations to establish an
appropriate management system and copyright infrastructure and to encourage
creativity’.126
A human rights framework favours this special solicitude for developing
states and eschews an expansive interpretation of the national treatment rule.
‘International assistance’ from rich to poor nations is an important dimension of
rights protection in the ICESCR.127 More importantly, the Covenant provides
special rules for developing countries, which ‘with due regard to human rights
and their national economy, may determine to what extent they would guarantee
the economic rights recognized in the present Covenant to non-nationals’.128
At first glance, this text appears to conflict with the national treatment rule to
the extent that it authorizes developing countries to enact legislation that mandates
or permits public or private CMOs to discriminate against foreign creators and
rights holders.129 The Committee’s interpretation of this provision, however, suggests that the creators’ rights provisions of the Covenant apply both to foreigners
and to a State’s own nationals.130 This interpretation also raises – but does not
resolve – the more difficult question of how to resolve conflicts between a state’s
obligations under a human rights treaty and the commitments the state has undertaken by ratifying intellectual property conventions.131

125. Ibid. (unequivocally responding in the negative to the question whether ‘any discrimination by
collective administration organizations (or by legislation regulating their activities’’ [is] permissible to the detriment of rights owners who are . . . foreigners’).
126. Ficsor, supra n. 12 at 151.
127. ICESCR, supra n. 2, Art. 2(1).
128. Ibid., Art. 2(3).
129. Of course, no treaty prevents foreign CMOs and their members from entering into agreements
with CMOs in developing countries to authorize the withholding of foreign works royalties for
cultural purposes in those countries. See Ficsor, supra n. 12 at 151. The plausibility of such
voluntary contributions seems questionable, however. If, as noted earlier, rights holders are
pressuring CMOs to reduce or eliminate domestic cultural promotions, it seems unlikely that
they will support cultural deductions that provide benefits only in other countries.
130. General Comment, supra n. 11 at para. 21.
131. Perhaps surprisingly to intellectual property lawyers, the Committee has suggested that these
conflicts should be resolved in favour of compliance with human rights treaty obligations.
See Statement on Human Rights and Intellectual Property, supra n. 9 at para. 12 (emphasizing
that ‘any intellectual property regime that makes it more difficult for a State party to comply
with its core obligations in relation to health, food, education, especially or any other right set
out in the Covenant, is inconsistent with the legally binding obligations of the State party’). For
an overview of the murky and unresolved rules for reconciling treaty conflicts, see L. Helfer,
‘Constitutional Analogies in the International Legal System’, Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review 37 (2003): 193 at 216–219.
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5

CONCLUSION: THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF
A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR THE
COLLECTIVE ADMINISTRATION OF COPYRIGHT

This chapter has explored how a human rights framework for creators’ rights – as
outlined by the ICESCR Committee in the General Comment on Article 15(1)(c)
and in the Statement on Human Rights and Intellectual Property – intersects with
the collective administration of copyright and neighbouring rights. Before concluding the analysis of these issues, it is worth considering two broader questions:
first, what are the practical consequences of a human rights framework for the
regulation of CMOs and, second, does that framework improve upon the existing
legal and policy landscape?
In answering the first question, it bears re-emphasizing that the Committee’s
analysis of the interface between human rights and intellectual property is still in its
early stages. In particular, the Committee has yet to publish general comments
interpreting all of the subsections of Article 15, several of which protect the rights
of the public. Until the Committee completes its analysis of all of the interrelated
clauses of Article 15, a human rights framework will remain a work in progress,
subject to revision and, possibly, contestation by states parties.
Recall too that the Committee’s general comments are only non-binding,
albeit highly persuasive, interpretations of the ICESCR. Given this soft law status,
it remains open to governments to challenge the Committee’s legal analysis. States
have opposed previous general comments issued by other UN human rights treaty
bodies.132 And such opposition may be a plausible option for some industrialized
countries if the Committee ultimately interprets Article 15 to give primacy to the
Covenant’s economic and social rights over the obligations of intellectual property
treaties – a result suggested by its preliminary review of the human rights –
intellectual property interface.133
Assuming, however, that most States parties endorse or at least acquiesce in
the Committee’s analysis, the general comments on Article 15 can serve more
useful and less contentious functions. They can assist governments in reporting
to the Committee on the steps they have taken, and the difficulties they have
encountered, in implementing the treaty domestically.134 The general comments
132. A decade ago, the United States objected to a general comment issued by the UN Human
Rights Committee, the treaty body that monitors implementation of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). See General Comments – Government Responses,
Observations on General Comment No. 24 (52), on Issues Relating to Reservations Made upon
Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to
Declarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant, United States of America, CCPR A/50/40/
Vol.1, Annex VI (1995) (contesting the authority of the UN Human Rights Committee to issue
binding interpretations of the ICCPR), <www.bayefsky.com/general/a_50_40_vol._i_
1995.php> (last visited: 9 Sep. 2009).
133. See Statement on Human Rights and Intellectual Property, supra n. 9 at para. 12.
134. ICESCR, supra n. 2, Arts 16–17 (setting forth reporting obligations of states parties to the
ICESCR).
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also can act as a catalyst for generating information about state practices
concerning the human rights dimensions of intellectual property, including the
regulation of CMOs.135 From this fund of knowledge and experience, the Committee can then provide more detailed guidance to governments on how to balance
the competing human rights concerns raised by the collective administration of
copyright, including the issues discussed in this chapter.
The answer to the second question posed above – whether a human rights
framework for intellectual property improves upon the existing legal and policy
landscape – depends in part on whether affected parties believe that the current
system is in need of reform. In the past, user groups have been the most frequent
and vociferous critics of collective management of copyright.136 But recent developments, such as the online distribution of protected works and the growing
number of works controlled by corporate rights owners,137 are increasing conflicts
among actors who create and exploit intellectual property products – including
tensions between individual and corporate rights owners and between CMOs and
their members.138 In this climate, a consensus may eventually develop on the need
for change. If so, a human rights framework offers a possible focal point around
which all parties can structure a revised regulatory regime.
It is unclear, however, whether all of the relevant actors will in fact endorse the
approach to CMO regulation that is implied by the Committee’s analysis. For one
thing, not all countries are bound by the ICESCR. This includes, most significantly,
the United States, which has signed the Covenant but shows no intention of ratifying
it.139 For another, the Committee has not yet provided a fully developed vision of how
to regulate the collective administration of copyright consistently with international
human rights law. These factors increase the risk of treaty conflicts and of applying
different legal rules to different nation states. They also create an uncertain regulatory
environment for private actors whose conduct transcends national borders.
The dangers of fragmentation and incoherence are real, but they are not insuperable. The creators’ rights provisions in the Covenant and the UDHR have
remained hidden in the shadows for far too long. In addition, the Committee
has only recently begun the slow and difficult process of giving a more precise
meaning to these provisions. To convince observers of the value of adopting a
human rights framework for intellectual property, including collective management, the Committee must lead with the persuasive force of its reasoning. Only by
demonstrating the values of this approach can the Committee hope to alter the
behaviour of governments and, through them, private parties, and thereby affect
the lives of the individuals and groups whose rights it is charged with protecting.
135. Given the many complex and contested issues that Art. 15 encompasses, however, the Committee will need to make a particular effort to discuss CMOs in its dialogues with government
representatives during the state reporting process.
136. See Helfer, supra n. 59 at 113–119; Sinacore-Guinn, supra n. 1 at 238–39.
137. See Graber, supra n. 93; Jokhadze, supra n. 75; Wallis, supra n. 75.
138. See supra Part 3.2.
139. See D. Weissbrodt, J. Fitzpatrick and F. Newman, International Human Rights: Law, Policy,
and Process, 3rd edn. (Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing, 2001), 1196 at 122 and 134–43.
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